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Professor Shapiro starts his book by saying that it has two purposes and
therefore ought to have two prefaces. By the same token it ought to have
two reviews.
One purpose of the book is to disprove certain commonly accepted pro-
positions about courts and thus "to move toward a more general theory of
the nature of judicial institutions."' The second purpose is to provide an
introductory text in comparative law. Thus, the author seeks to enlist
comparative law in support of legal theory and legal theory in support of
comparative law.
The propositions challenged by Shapiro are four in number. Together,
they are said to constitute the "conventional prototype" of courts: first,
that courts are independent; second, that they decide cases on the basis of
preexisting rules; third, that they operate by an adversary procedure in
which one party wins and the other loses; and fourth, that justice requires
that the losing party be given the right to appeal. Indeed, Professor Sha-
piro argues that not only the fourth proposition, but the first three as well,
are commonly presented as requirements for doing justice and hence as
means of inducing two parties in conflict to submit to adjudication by a
third. His own analysis, on the other hand, as the subtitle suggests, is a
"political" one. He contends that courts, as instruments of government,
are politically dependent on the sovereign, make law as well as apply it,
t Ames Professor, Harvard Law School
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by no means restrict themselves exclusively to the adversary process, and
provide for appeals not because of any requirement of justice but in order
to permit the central political authority to maintain a uniform policy.
The author seeks to prove these points by the comparative method,
which, as he states, is a substitute for the experimental method used in the
natural sciences-"not a terribly satisfactory substitute but one pressed
upon us by the impossibility of putting laws and nations in test tubes and
bubble chambers." 2 "The rationale of the book," he writes,
is simple. A number of propositions are offered. My own position
toward each of the propositions is then tested against the 'worst
case,' that is against the body of known legal phenomena most likely
to falsify my position. The accumulated scholarship of comparative
law is used as a catalogue for searching out these worst cases.3
The proof that it is "incorrect, or at least incomplete and misleading,"
to say that courts are independent is drawn from English legal history. It
is argued that if even in England, the country of maximum judicial inde-
pendence, courts have always been subservient to the political sovereign,
then the conventional prototype of courts as independent agencies is
clearly erroneous. Similarly, proof that it is wrong to say that courts de-
cide cases on the basis of preexisting legal norms is drawn from the his-
tory of continental European law ("the civil law system"). Again, this is
postulated to be the "worst case" for the author's position. The "myth"
that courts operate by adversary procedure, with one party winning all or
nothing, is attacked on the basis of traditional Chinese law, which is gen-
erally thought to have sharply separated (adversarial) adjudication and
(non-adversarial) mediation. In fact, Professor Shapiro argues, Chinese
law wholly mixed the two. Finally, Professor Shapiro examines one of the
few developed legal systems that does not provide for the right of ap-.
peal-the traditional Islamic system. He argues that the absence of that
right does not stem from a lack of concern for justice or for satisfying the
losing party but rather from a lack of concern for central political control
over judicial decisions due to the absence of any central political or ecclesi-
astical authority.
Thus, comparative law-and more than that, comparative legal his-
tory-is enlisted in support of legal theory. This is an important contribu-
tion to the jurisprudential literature of our time, so much of which is
written from the perspective of only one legal system. Even those who
write about legal theory from a comparative perspective too often confine
2. Id.
3. Id.
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themselves to Western legal systems. Professor Shapiro's book is of a
genre that has been too much neglected since the writings of such men as
Kohler, Ehrlich, and Pound.
A great difficulty, however, in such writings is to balance the breadth of
the legal theories against the particularities of the individual legal systems
that are being examined. Professor Shapiro's description of the "conven-
tional prototype" of courts is an example of this difficulty. The proposi-
tions are so broad that they can as easily be proved as disproved. We may
agree that it is misleading to say that courts are independent; but then
again, it may be even more misleading to say that they are not. Likewise,
it may be misleading to say that they decide on the basis of preexisting
norms, but it may be even more misleading to say that they do not decide
on the basis of preexisting norms. Indeed, much of Profesor Shapiro's
proof that courts are subservient to the sovereign political authority (and
hence not independent) also supports the conclusion that they decide cases
on the basis of legal norms previously declared by the political sovereign.
Similarly, it seems undeniable that there is an "inter-mix of conflict
resolution, social control, and lawmaking in most courts," as well as a
"frequent integration of judging with administrative or general political
authority," so that "a substantial share of courts and judges seem to be
engaging in politics."" On the other hand, it seems equally undeniable
that adjudication is different from running for office or lobbying or adopt-
ing a national budget. To say that judges make law is not to say that
judges make statutes.
Professor Shapiro's alternative to the conventional prototype of courts,
adumbrated in this book, is also framed so broadly that almost any
model-even the one he attacks-can be fitted within it. Indeed, at one
point the author himself suggests that even extreme formalism in adjudi-
cation, where it exists, also serves a "political" function. The trouble here
is less with the word "law" than with the word "politics." By a shift in
the meaning of that word, Clausewitz was able to show that war is not
essentially different from peace.
The second purpose of the book is to enlist legal theory in support of
comparative law. The author states that he intends to provide an intro-
ductory text that can be used in courses on comparative legal systems. The
descriptions of the various systems are inevitably biased somewhat by the
selective emphasis Professor Shapiro places on different aspects of the ju-
dicial process. Nevertheless, the four chapters on English, Continental
European, Chinese, and Islamic law, respectively, constitute valuable
4. P. 63.
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short summaries of the general secondary literature concerning adjudica-
tion in those legal systems.
It is somewhat paradoxical that Professor Shapiro has been able to use
the conventional secondary literature-he disclaims resort to original
sources, and does not venture very far beyond general treatises-as a basis
for attack on the conventional prototype of courts. Here the chief difficulty
lies with the conventional secondary literature. While I am not prepared
to pass judgment on such literature in the fields of Chinese and Islamic
legal history, I can say that reliance on the classic writings about English
and Continental European legal history will inevitably result in profound
misconceptions as to the nature of the legal systems they purport to por-
tray. This is not to say that the authors of those classics themselves had
mistaken conceptions, but only that they have presented the subject so se-
lectively as to lead the unsuspecting general reader -who does not know
what the authors chose to omit-into error. Most of the classic texts do
not attempt to give a complete view of the legal history of any nation or
group of nations. Their scope is generally restricted to those parts of the
story that had significance for certain later developments. In short, legal
history has not yet been written in a way that will support the kinds of
insights that are demanded by contemporary political science.
Thus, in recounting the history of judicial institutions in England, Pro-
fessor Shapiro states that ever since the Norman conquest there has been a
"long-term English tendency toward extreme political centralization," and
that the English courts were increasingly subjected to the political control,
first of the king, and then of the king in Parliament. "The theory of the
British constitution," he writes, "has always been one of complete, abso-
lute, and unified sovereignty."' From the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries
there was, he asserts, a progressive increase in royal control over the
judges. In the seventeenth century that control was shifted to Parliament.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to be sure, judges were given
more freedom and more power (and hence could be said to be more inde-
pendent). But in the twentieth century, England has become a socialist
state in which most disputes are settled by some 2,000 administrative
tribunals.' Thus "no matter what the temporary victories of the nine-
teenth century, the English courts did not become independent in the sev-
enteenth but merely exchanged a royal master for a Parliamentary one."
And in the twentieth century, "the judges are again the faithful servants
of the crown although the crown is now the cabinet and the bureaucracy
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This portrait of English legal history is presented in about fifty-five
pages. The first twenty-five, devoted to the period from the eleventh to the
sixteenth centuries, describe the origin and development of a royal judici-
ary, of jury trial, of the writ system, of the forms of action, and of equity.
The creation of Star Chamber and other prerogative courts by the Tudor
monarchy is seen as a natural extension of these earlier developments.
What is wrong with this picture? The answer lies less in what is
presented than in what is omitted. One would suppose that the author is
talking about the law by which the people of England were governed. In
fact, he is talking almost exclusively about only one part of that law: the
law applicable in the Courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, called
the English common law. From the twelfth through the sixteenth centu-
ries, however, the people of England were also governed by various other
kinds of law.' Unfortunately, most of the standard writings on English
legal history upon which Professor Shapiro relies are devoted largely to
the English common law.
Thus Professor Shapiro can write, "[alt least until the eighteenth cen-
tury the central concern of English law was the land."9 What English
law? The law applicable in the ecclesiastical courts? Certainly not. The
law applicable in the English mercantile courts? Certainly not. And cer-
tainly not the law applicable in the English borough courts. As early as
the thirteenth century there were approximately three hundred towns in
England, each with its own urban government and urban courts. Never-
theless, urban law is not mentioned by Professor Shapiro, and it is treated
only incidentally in most standard works on English legal history.
The existence prior to the sixteenth century in all countries of Western
Christendom, including England, of plural concurrent jurisdictions and
plural concurrent bodies of law is closely connected with the question of
judicial independence. In fact, there was no possibility of "complete, abso-
lute, and unified sovereignty" in England until Henry VIII declared him-
self to be supreme head of the church in 1535. Prior to that, the papal
curia in Rome was the supreme court for English ecclesiastical causes,
which included not only family questions and wills but also many types of
crimes, contracts, property, and a host of other matters. Even apart from
the church courts there were concurrent royal, feudal, urban, and mercan-
tile jurisdictions. This competition among courts was both a foundation
for, and a manifestation of, the principle that the king himself was subject
to law, a principle affirmed repeatedly in those centuries not only in Eng-
land but also in most other parts of Europe.
8. See pp. 387-88 infra.
9. P. 93.
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The fact that royal jurisdiction in the formative era of English law,
from the twelfth through the fifteenth centuries, was understood to be a
limited jurisdiction acquired special significance in the seventeenth cen-
tury, when that earlier history was invoked against the new royal absolu-
tism of the Tudor-Stuart period. The English Revolution of 1640-1689
cannot be adequately described simply as a transfer of sovereignty from
the crown to the Parliament. It is true that Parliament was then given, in
theory, "complete, absolute, and unified sovereignty." But that theory was
linked with an accompanying theory of judicial independence. The latter
theory was no more a "myth" than the former. And, in actual practice,
the Bill of Rights of 1689 and other proclamations of the liberty of the
subject were treated as fundamental law, binding on Parliament and judi-
ciary alike.
Conventional legal historiography is equally inadequate, in my view, as
support for the kinds of propositions Professor Shapiro seeks to establish
concerning French, German, and Italian law. Here his attack is on the
view that in "civil or Roman law systems," judges decide cases according
to rules set forth in codes. He starts with a brief account of the develop-
ment of Roman law up to the time of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian,
whose "code" was a vast "catalogue of specific solutions to specific
problems."' 0 He then turns to the rediscovery of Justinian's texts in the
West five centuries later. "No very satisfactory explanation for the enor-
mous immediate appeal and rapid spread of the revived Roman law has
been offered," he states." (Incidentally, that is not true; but one would
have to go much deeper into the historical literature than he has done in
order to find such an explanation.) 12 For whatever reasons, "the revived
Roman law . . . provided the vocabulary and conceptual apparatus used
in their daily work by [European] lawyers and judges.""
Professor Shapiro then jumps from the eleventh-century "revival" of
Roman law to its "reception" in Germany, which he does not date, but
which is usually attributed to the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of
the sixteenth centuries. He states that, like the earlier "revival," the later
"reception" did not result in any formal enactment of the law contained in
10. P. 129.
11. P. 130.
12. Cf Berman, The Origin of Western Legal Science, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1977). The revi-
val of Roman law in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries was closely connected with the revolution-
ary upheavel in the church, called at the time the Gregorian Reformation, which resulted in the
establishment of ecclesiastical independence under the papacy, a dual ecclesiastical-secular jurisdiction,
and the modern system of canon law.
13. P. 130.
Vol. 91: 383, 1981
Courts
Justinian's texts but was "essentially a cultural and academic rather than
a legislative movement." 4
With that, we are up to the later eighteenth century:
On the eve of the French Revolution the Roman law in Europe was
not a code enacted by a sovereign legislator and applied by a judge.
Instead, Roman law consisted of a body of academic commentary
* .. A judicial decision was not the result of applying a statutory
rule but of finding a solution to a particular case compatible with the
views of a learned legal community of which the judge was a
member."' 5
The author then turns to the French Civil Code of 1804 and the Ger-
man Civil Code of 1900. The former is largely a set, not of rules, in the
narrow sense, but of principles, or of "very general [rules] that must be
explicated by legal learning.""' The latter is "not so much a complete and
detailed set of laws as an incredibly elaborate textbook about law."' 7
Against the background of this history, Professor Shapiro concludes that
the style of Continental judicial opinions, which generally take the form of
a direct commentary on and intepretation of the relevant code provisions,
is misleading: "Almost invariably when a Continental judge purports to
be drawing a series of definitions, doctrines, and conclusions from the code
by logical exegesis, in reality he is acknowledging the body of legal doc-
trines built up around the bare words of the code by previous cases." 8
Thus the difference between the "civil or Roman law" system of continen-
tal Europe and the "Anglo-American" system, in which "law is made case
by 'case by the judges themselves,"' 9 is found to be insubstantial. In
neither system do the judges "consistently decide according to preexisting
legal rules." 0
The word "consistently" introduces a material change in the argument.
It suggests the possibility that in all the legal systems under considera-
tion-the English, the American, the French, the German, the Italian,
and others-courts are supposed to decide on the basis of preexisting rules
to the extent that such rules do actually preexist and are applicable to the
cases at hand. At the same time, however, they are supposed to decide on
other grounds, including legal doctrines, basic principles, and accepted
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plied. Further, in all the legal systems under consideration, judges often
play a creative role in making law case by case; but that, too, implies the
"pre-existence" of rules, doctrines, principles, and concepts, implicit in de-
cided cases. After all, for a case to "make law" it must have a preexisting
value for subsequent cases.
Professor Shapiro's history of the law of "Continental Europe" is con-
fined largely to an account of the influence of Roman law or, more pre-
cisely, Romanist legal science. He only mentions the development of Ger-
manic law in passing and says nothing of the development of the canon
law of the Roman Catholic Church which, in fact, was the first modern
legal system, built partly out of the vocabulary and concepts of the revived
Roman law of the late eleventh and twelfth centuries. One is reminded of
the great German journal of legal history, the Savigny Zeitschrift, which
is divided into three parts: the Romanist division, the Germanist division,
and the Canonist division, each with its own editorial board and, until
recently, each published separately. In real life, of course, the same people
lived under all three bodies of law; a German or Frenchman of, say, the
sixteenth century, might have his rights as a merchant adjudicated under
principles of Roman law, his rights as a tenant of land adjudicated under
principles of Germanic or Frankish law, and his rights as an heir adjudi-
cated under principles of canon law. A nineteenth-century law professor
in the university, however, usually subscribed to-and perhaps wrote arti-
cles for-either the Romanist division or the Germanist division or the
Canonist division of the Savigny Zeitschrift. In more recent times, much
valuable work has been done to bring together Germanist and Romanist
legal history. 21 The missing link has been the history of canon law, espe-
cially in the period from the twelfth to the sixteenth century, when it
served as a model or foil for all the various secular legal systems of the
West.21
Ultimately, Western legal historiography will have to overcome these
antiquated divisions of perspective and achieve a new synthesis, before it
can serve as an adequate basis for a political science, let alone a sociology,
of law. Until that synthesis is achieved, books such as Courts will inevita-
bly fall short of their goal.
21. See J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW. This important work deals at far greater length
with much of the same subject-matter as that dealt with by Professor Shapiro in his chapters on
English and Continental European Law. Professor Shapiro has cited it but has not utilized its insights
into the interweaving of Germanic and Romanist elements, especially in German and French law.
Unfortunately, Professor Dawson, too, has neglected the influence of the canon law of the church on
English legal history, especially in its formative period.
22. See Berman, supra note 12, at 894; Berman, Theological Sources of the Western Legal Tradi-
tion, 46 REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 371-411 (1979); Berman, The
Background of the Western Legal Tradition in the Folklaw of the Peoples of Europe, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 533-597 (1978). These constitute three chapters of a forthcoming book, LAW AND REVOLUTION:
THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION, to be published by the Harvard University
Press.
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A Round Trip to Eire: Two Books on
the Irish Constitution
Cases and Materials on the Irish Constitution. By James O'Reilly
and Mary Redmond. Dublin: The Incorporated Law Society of Ire-
land, 1980. Pp. 698.
The Irish Constitution. By J. M. Kelly. Dublin: Jurist
Publishing Co., Ltd., 1980. Pp. 592.
Charles L. Black, Jr.t
From about a century before the birth of Dante until some sixty years
ago, the Irish lived under a "constitution" so grotesque as hardly to rise to
the tragic, though much tragedy was enacted under it-a "constitution"
whose essence was the subjection of this sensitive and gifted people, prime
carriers of European culture before England was England, to the kings
and kingdom across the Irish Sea. That was a long time; one might have
thought that authentic constitutionalism, so long postponed, would be slow
to develop in Ireland after the rough justice of independence was finally
attained in 1921. Not at all. These books, appearing nearly simultane-
ously in 1980, depict-in the realistic tones of concrete professonalism-a
constitution live and healthy, questing beyond the structures of govern-
ment into the field of human rights as subjects of constitutional law. An
American must be proud that all of this, most especially in the human-
rights component, shows here and there what O'Reilly and Redmond call
in their Preface "[t]he persuasive authority in Irish law of the Supreme
Court of the United States."1
The O'Reilly and Redmond book is the first casebook on Ireland's con-
stitutional law, with much clarifying commentary. Professor Kelly's book
is an excellent systematic treatise. These works closely complement one
another; together, they produce in the reader the impression, all too likely
self-flattering, that he has learned a little something about the Irish
constitution.
One senses in each of them that practical humaneness, that search for
t Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. J. O'REILLY & M. REDMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE IRISH CONSTITUTION vii
(1980).
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insight into the connections between constitutional law and the rest of life,
that one finds in the best American writing on our own Constitution. One
even begins to feel-with the great caution engendered by the knowledge
that one is after all dealing with a legal system not one's own-that these
works might furnish many illuminating points of comparison in teaching
American constitutional law. (Indeed, I am not going to promise that I
shall never try that, for I am sure I would find the promise impossible to
keep. When an Irish judge can shape his judgment explicitly around Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp,z what
Karl Llewellyn called "reverse loadings" may be possible.)
It is natural that we should be most interested in the human-rights
material presented in these works. Here the Irish material, to a significant
degree, recapitulates our own strivings, though on a much shorter frame
of time.
The Irish Constitution of 1922 "devoted . . . little space . . . [to
human-rights material], . . and. . . played almost no part in the main-
tenance of those rights."3 Since the overwhelming majority of American
Supreme Court holdings in support of human rights have been in respect
of violations by the States, the analogy with our own pre-Fourteenth
Amendment period is plain; indeed, even our national Bill of Rights pro-
duced little fruit before the Civil War. The broader and more general
human-rights provisions that came with the 1937 Irish Constitution show
no impressive early results; much the same can be said of our own post-
Civil War amendments. In each system there set in at last an irresistible
tendency toward rationalization and generalization of the human-rights
material. It is interesting to compare the respective technical means found
for the implementing of this tendency.
The most obvious available provision in the Constitution of Ireland is
Article 40.3:
The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practica-
ble, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the
citizen . . . . The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as
best it may from unjust attack and, in case .of injustice done, vindi-
cate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every
citizen.4
For nearly three decades the generalities in this section lay latent, but in
2. 374 U.S. 203 (1963), so used by Mr. Justice Walsh in Quinn's Supermarket v. Attorney Gen-
eral, [1972] I.R. 1, 28 (Sup. Ct.), reprinted in J. O'REILLY & M. REDMOND, supra note 1, at 680-83.
3. J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 328 (1980).
4. IR. CONST. art. 40.3, reprinted in J. M. KELLY, supra note 3, at 360; J. O'REILLY, supra note
1, at 488.
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1965, in Ryan v. Attorney Generals the Irish Supreme Court stated that
the section justified judicial review over a general range of human rights,
whether or not explicitly named in the Constitution; a number of such
rights have been recognized.
Again, the parallel with our own development is clear enough. The
quest for a generalized law of human rights is indeed irresistible. It is
ironic but revealing that in 1925 the ultra-conservative Justice McReyn-
olds, for a unanimous Court, crossed decisively into the territory of the
open-ended series of human rights.' It is doubtful that any Justice on our
Court since then has had a voting record that can be reconciled with rejec-
tion of the openness of this series. The parallelism of these two
quests-ours and that of the Irish-is illustrated by the judgment of Mr.
Justice Henchy in a contraception case7 wherein he approvingly discusses
and in part follows Griswold v. Connecticut.8
The thrust towards generalization of human-rights law has been irre-
sistible, to us and to the Irish, because it is powered by the two most
urgent motives for law. It expresses the foremost moral commitment of
both nations, congenital to both, because the claim of each to existence and
independence rested on human-rights doctrines. And it makes possible full
rationality in the highest law -not the "because-it-says-so" rationality of
limitation to accidental tags and scraps of specificity, nor yet the rational-
ity of abstract "principle" impossible to form or to apply, but that work-
ing rationality of law that perpetually scrutinizes the likenesses and dif-
ferences of solutions to which we are committed and new problems with
which we are presented, standing perpetually ready to justify any differ-
ence in actions taken by pointing to a convincing difference-a difference
that ought to make a difference-in the new problem.'
The Irish have relied on their Article 40.3. Our own technical ba-
ses-"substantive due process" and "equal protection"- have so far been
less satisfactory than theirs. "Substantive due process" is a paradox not
made any less one by incantatory repetition; "equality" (except as against
racial discrimination and any discriminaton analogous thereto, wherein a
pinch of rough history is worth a peck of philosophy) must be (given the
fact that law is systematized inequality) a phrase that gives no push to-
5. [1965] I.R. 294 (Sup. Ct.).
6. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). A companion case, decided at the same
time and with the same opinion, sustained a parent's right to send a child to military school. This
latter is the more important case here, for no religious element entered, and there could thus be no
slightest question of a tacit reliance on a right "named" in the First Amendment.
7. McGee v. Attorney General, [1974] I.R. 284, 328 (Sup. Ct.), quoted in J. O'REILLY & M.
REDMOND, supra note 1, at 511; J.M. KELLY, supra note 3, at 370.
8. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. J.M. KELLY, supra note 3, at 361-62.
The Yale Law Journal
ward resolution of any problem. It is one of the strangest puzzles in all
legal history that our legal culture, searching for professionally sound
means of legitimating the generalization of human-rights law, has never
yet turned serious and sustained attention toward the text of our Ninth
Amendment. From across the Atlantic, that Amendment was quite visible
to Mr. Justice Walsh, in McGee v. Attorney General:
According to the preamble, the [Irish] people gave themselves the
Constitution to promote the common good with due observance of
prudence, justice and charity so that the dignity and freedom of the
individual might be assured. The judges must, therefore, as best they
can from their training and their experience interpret these rights in
accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice and charity. It is but
natural that from time to time the prevailing ideas of these virtues
may be conditioned by the passage of time; no interpretation of the
Constitution is intended to be final for all time. It is given in the
light of prevailing ideas and concepts. The development of the consti-
tutional law of the United States of America is ample proof of this.
There is a Constitution which, while not professing to be governed
by the precepts of Christianity, also in the Ninth Amendment
recognises the existence of rights other than those referred to ex-
pressly in it and its amendments.10
How would one explain to Mr. Justice Walsh why it is that, in a coun-
try in quest of a legitimating base for rational development of a corpus
juris of human rights, the Ninth Amendment is hardly mentioned in most
casebooks in constitutional law?
When, someday, we decide at last to go about the task so plainly set us
by the Ninth Amendment, there may be things to be learned from the
Irish, as they have learned from us. For example, we might consider the
saying of Justice Kenny in Ryan v. Attorney General." He intimates that
a law ought to be struck down if "there is no reasonable proportion be-
tween the benefits which the legislation will confer on the citizens or a
substantial body of them and the interference with the personal rights of
the citizen."' 2 That one commitment would suffice to justify the results in
Griswold v. Connecticut," Moore v. City of East Cleveland,4 Pierce v.
10. [1974] I.R. 284, 319 (Sup. Ct.), reprinted in J. O'REILLY & M. REDMOND, supra note 1, at
157.
1I. [1965] I.R. 294 (Sup. Ct.), reprinted in J. O'REILLY & M. Redmond, supra note 1, at 489.
12. Id. at 313, J. O'RELLY & M. REDMOND at 491.
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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Society of Sisters,15 Frontiero v. Richardson,16 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 7 and
many, many other cases over a vast range of fact patterns. I venture to say
it would justify almost every affirmative "unnamed right" decision yet ut-
tered in our Court; the few it would not justify are, indeed, suspect. If it
had been accepted, the draft-card burning case 18 would have been decided
rightly.
This "gross disproportionality" criterion is, moreover, the least possible
corollary to a practical, serious, and above all general attachment to "lib-
erty." We seem to feel somewhow obliged to persist in the absurd notion
that the organic act creating our nation, and the language stating the pur-
poses of its eventual organization, are to play no part in law, no part in
helping us give concreteness to the generalities of the Ninth Amendment.
We ought instead to see ourselves permanently committed to "liberty" as
a cardinal value in law-outranking even such root-values as the so-called
"sanctity" of contracts-by the Declaration of Independence and by the
Preamble to our Constitution. Here is a beginning toward the task of law-
finding that the Ninth Amendment both legitimates and commands.
Unlike the Irish, we have no Pacem in Terris to underlie our law of
human rights. But is it quite unthinkable that, in the fullness of develop-
ment of our law, we should nevertheless come to see as fundamental, even
in that law, the right "to the means which are necessary and suitable for
the proper development of life . . . primarily food, clothing, shelter, rest,
medical care, and finally the necessary social services"? 9 That is not un-
thinkable at all, if the guarantee of a right such as "freedom of speech"
implies the guarantee of a right to things without which "freedom of
speech" means nothing, politically or intellectually. It is not unthinkable if
the right to "the pursuit of happiness," passing into the Ninth Amend-
ment, means not just the right to try to clamber out of a pool full of
sharks with your hands tied behind your back, but the right to be vouch-
safed those material things without which "the pursuit of happiness" very
plainly cannot so much as begin.
Ours may seem bad times for thoughts like these. But thought must in
such times prepare for better times. These are times for reordering of
theory. Wrong theory can produce disastrously wrong corollaries in
speech and thought. In talking of the public relief of poverty, the public
redressing of grotesque economic imbalance, we have fallen into the
15. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
16. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
17. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
19. The encylical Pacem in Terris of Pope John XXIII, quoted in Ryan v. Attorney General,
[1965] I.R. 294, 314 (Sup. Ct.).
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wrong way of appealing to "compassion." We ought to prepare ourselves
for an insistent appeal to justice, the main business of the state.
Neither we nor the Irish have reached this point. Pacem in Terris may
make it, for them, an acknowledged if not yet even a quite visible goal.
But a thought of John XXIII, on the rights, the entitlements, of people as
people, cannot be dismissed as preposterous, whether or not one is bound
by its authority. And we can, when we are ready, reach the same point
through the Ninth Amendment, informed by the Declaration and the Pre-
amble. Readiness is all, at least for this century. Right now it is all we
have. But, if we keep it, it will in the end be all we need.
I find that these books have caused me to think a little more about our
own law, even as I was led to learn a little more about Ireland. I shall
keep reading them.
Liberalism Without Foundations?
Social Justice in the Liberal State. By Bruce Ackerman. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. Pp. xii, 392. $17.50.
Gilbert Harmant
Here is an inspiring account of the perfectly liberal state, a state whose
basis is not some prior conception of the good, we are told, but never-
ending discussion, "neutral dialogue."1 In this state, any exercise of power
is subject to challenge and, if challenged, must be shown to be justified.
2
Any challenged premises of a proposed justification must in turn be given
a justification, which might then be challenged, and so on. Challenges
must be principled in that they must appeal to some alternative justifica-
tion for the distribution of power, and those alternative justifications are
themselves subject to challenge. All proposed justifications, however, must
be "neutral."3 They may not rely on a privileged insight into the moral
universe-that is, an insight not available to everyone.' They may not
assume that one conception of the good is intrinsically better than another
conception of the good, and may not assume that some people are intrinsi-
cally superior to others.'
Ackerman argues that many attempts to justify power relationships will
fail to survive the challenge of neutral dialogue. For example, a utilitarian
must confront the question why happiness, rather than (say) knowledge,
should be taken as the ultimate good. A utilitarian justification of power
relations is ruled out unless the utilitarian can give a neutral answer to
this and similar challenges, and that seems unlikely."
It is natural to wonder whether any justification of power relationships
could survive such a challenge. Ackerman's interesting (but highly im-
plausible) claim is that at least one sort of justification can survive. He
argues that an equal distribution of power can be justified on the ground
that because each person is at least as good as any other, each person is
t Professor of Philosophy, Princeton University.
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entitled to at least as much (power, wealth, etc.) as any other person.7
This principle, he asserts, does not violate neutrality. It does not say that
anyone is better than anyone else, only that each person is at least as good
as anyone else. So, he concludes, there is a prima facie case for an equal
distribution of resources in a liberal state.
According to Ackerman, then, liberalism leads to a commitment to egal-
itarianism. Yet Ackerman denies that liberal theory is premised on an
assumption of egalitarianism. "Liberal theory," he says, "does not begin
with an ipse dixit on behalf of material equality; instead, it begins with a
commitment to a process of constrained conversation." 8
We shall see. First let us review Ackerman's method and results.
Method
Ackerman's method for bringing out the implications of such "conversa-
tion" is to consider how things would go in a highly idealized case and
then to take up complications one at a time.' So he begins by imagining a
neutral dialogue among the inhabitants of a spaceship that is about to
land on a new planet containing a single kind of valuable and highly
adaptable resource, which he calls "manna." The discussants are to pro-
pose principles for distributing this resource among themselves. There
happens to be a "perfect technology of justice" available that will enforce
the principles agreed upon; 0 there are also methods of perfect communi-
cation," ways to select among messages sent in one's direction, " and ways
to shield one person from another."
Ackerman discusses what might be the upshot of a dialogue concerned
with a one-time distribution in these circumstances. He next considers
questions that arise when the children of the original inhabitants of the
planet reach the point at which they can participate in neutral dialogue.
Those questions lead to an examination of genetic policy, 4 principles of




10. Under the assumption of a "perfect technology of justice," any substantive conclusion of a
neutral dialogue can be implemented costlessly. The assumption serves "as a kind of conceptual sorter,
discriminating between the problems that liberal theory must answer in all possible worlds where
people struggle for power from those that arise only under one or another kind of imperfect technol-
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So far the discussion is based on the ideal assumption of a perfect tech-
nology of justice. 8 Ackerman goes on to consider the theory of the "second
best" case, in which allowances must be made for what is feasible given
actual technology. 9 "Third best theory" would allow also for the com-
promises that must be made because of the existence in the actual world of
entrenched power structures that cannot be defended on liberal grounds
but that will not simply disappear once their illegitimacy (in that sense) is
pointed out.20 Ackerman does not attempt in the present book to elaborate
such a "third best theory."
Results
On this foundation, Ackerman builds an argument that the liberal state
will have the following features: Its citizens are all those who can partici-
pate in liberal dialogue.2' Citizenship is restricted (for example, by immi-
gration laws) only on "second best" grounds, that is, only if a restriction is
needed to protect the very process of liberal conversation.22 The basic
rights of the society are possessed by all citizens, and only by citizens.
Animals have no rights;23 nor do unconceived or unborn people.24 Contra-
ception and abortion are permitted.
25
Everyone begins life under conditions of material equality, an equality
that applies both within and between generations. 2' To the extent that it
is technologically feasible, no one is "genetically dominated" by anyone
else.27 Those, if any, who are genetically handicapped are compensated in
such a way that they begin life with resources equal to those everyone else
has.28 Everyone receives a liberal education that prepares him or her for a
great range of possibilities. 29 Everyone is able to exchange freely his or her
entitlements within a "flexible transactional network."" Everyone, at the
moment of death, has fulfilled his or her obligations of "liberal trustee-
ship," passing on to the next generation a power structure no less liberal
than the one he or she has enjoyed.3
18. See note 10 supra.
19. Pp. 231-72.
20. Pp. 232-33.
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Reaction
Ackerman's vision is certainly inspiring. In fact, it seems too good to be
true! Can all of this richly described society be the expected result of neu-
tral dialogue? Can purely formal constraints yield such substantive con-
clusions? Can one really pull a rabbit out of an empty hat?
The answer, of course, is no. Purely formal constraints cannot by them-
selves suffice for a substantive conclusion. One cannot pull a rabbit out of
an empty hat. If the hat is really empty to begin with, the rabbit has come
from somewhere else (perhaps from under one's vest). On the other hand,
if the rabbit really does come from the hat, the hat must not have been
empty at the start.
A Closer Look
Let us take a closer look at Ackerman's argument. One crucial move
occurs when he argues (A) that a view such as utilitarianism cannot be
sustained in neutral dialogue because there is no way to offer a neutral
defense of happiness, rather than something else (for example,
knowledge), as a measure of goodness,32 but (B) that an egalitarian princi-
ple can be sustained on the ground that each person is "as good as" any
other."
Why does Ackerman suppose an egalitarian principle can be sustained
in this way? The answer, I think, is this. Someone might challenge the
justification by contesting the claim that one person is just as good as an-
other. But that would require the challenger to maintain that at least one
person is better than another, a remark that is not allowed in neutral
dialogue. Thus, under the neutrality constraint, the claim that one person
is just as good as another cannot successfully be challenged.
But that is not the end of the matter. There is another way to challenge
Ackerman's justification of egalitarianism, one that he appears to have
overlooked. Why should we suppose that one person being just as good as
another is a reason for the two having equal power? Why should we
accept that view rather than, for example, the utilitarian view that power
should be distributed so as to maximize happiness? Unless a neutral rea-
son can be given for preferring egalitarianism to utilitarianism, Acker-
man's egalitarianism does not, after all, survive the challenge of neutral
dialogue, and indeed, it becomes quite unclear how any view could survive
this challenge. The rabbit cannot come from an empty hat.
It might be suggested that one cannot appeal to utilitarianism to chal-
32. Pp. 45-49.
33. Pp. 53-59.
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lenge egalitarianism because a challenge can come only from a position
that itself survives neutral dialogue, and utilitarianism does not. But this
rejoinder will not do, for utilitarianism fails to survive only because it has
no nonneutral way to meet the challenge of alternatives that themselves
also do not survive. Moreover, we cannot rule out utilitarianism as a chal-
lenger on the ground that it has already been rejected by the time we have
gotten to egalitarianism, because that ground could reflect nothing more
than the order in which views have been considered. (I assume that Ack-
erman does not think we could defend utilitarianism simply by refusing to
consider it until its competitors have ruled each other out in previous neu-
tral dialogue, so that no competitor was left to challenge utilitarianism. If
that assumption is correct, egalitarianism cannot be defended in that way
either.)
Can the egalitarian say that one person's being just "as good" as an-
other is obviously a reason for the one to have as much as the other, a
reason needing no further argument? On its face, that assertion would
seem to violate neutrality. The egalitarian would be claiming to have a
privileged insight into the moral universe. That would be so unless "as
good as" simply means "as deserving as." In that case, it would indeed be
trivially true that, if one person is "as good" as another, the one deserves
as much as the other; it would be true by definition. If that is so, however,
to say that one person is "as good" as another would not be to give a
reason for the one to have as much as another but would simply be to say
that the one should have as much as the other. To offer this principle as a
"reason" would simply be to beg the question against nonegalitarian
views. And if this flat assertion really were licensed by the constraint on
"neutral dialogue" then liberal theory would indeed "begin with an ipse
dixit on behalf of material equality," as a crucial part of its "commitment
to a process of constrained conversation." 34 The rabbit would be coming
from the hat, but only because it was there at the beginning. The hat
would not really have been empty after all.
A Related Problem
Ackerman points out that "second best theory" must allow for our im-
perfect technology.35 We do not have perfect shields; we cannot guarantee
perfect transactional flexibility; we cannot offer everyone a perfect liberal
education; and so on. Furthermore, he observes, committed liberals can
honestly disagree about how much of society's resources should be spent
34. Pp. 57-58, quoted at p. 398 supra.
35. Pp. 231-34.
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on those various things." Any given distribution of resources, however, is
subject to challenge by proponents of a different distribution. So, after all
is said and done, there will remain differences of opinion that cannot be
resolved by "neutral" dialogue.37 But then, by the reasoning that rules out
utilitarianism, it would seem that all of the opinions must be rejected.
Surprisingly, Ackerman does not draw that conclusion. He argues in-
stead that issues of distribution must be decided by majority vote. This
argument appeals to certain advantages of majority vote over other meth-
ods of voting. 8 But this argument offers no reply to the obvious challenge,
by losers in the voting, that such issues should be directly decided in a
certain specified way and not by any sort of voting at all. It is hard to see
what response might be made to that challenge. So it would seem that the
principle of majority vote cannot survive "neutral" dialogue.
It is puzzling that Ackerman does not see the problem here (if there
really is a problem; perhaps I am overlooking something). He himself
observes that someone might challenge his proposal that the specified is-
sues should be decided by majority vote, with the competing proposal that
they should be decided by a lottery. He says this challenge cannot be re-
solved by "neutral" dialogue. 9 If that counterproposal cannot be dis-
missed, however, it would seem that neither proposal can serve as an ade-
quate justification in Ackerman's framework for the power relationships
they would give rise to. If so, "neutral" dialogue can offer no solution to
the tradeoff problems that arise because of our imperfect technology of
justice. In other words, it can offer no "theory of the second best" and is
restricted to the theory of the ideal case.
Conclusion
You can't get something from nothing. Ackerman's liberal state has to
have foundations after all. It cannot be constructed from purely neutral
dialogue. The construction works only if participants in the dialogue are
restricted to people who are already committed to certain substantive
36. P. 274.
37. Pp. 274-75.
38. On the basis of a theorem proved by K. 0. May, Ackerman argues that majority rule is the
only voting rule, or method of aggregating individual preferences, that can be justifed by arguments
that do not violate any conversational constraint. May proved that majority rule is the only decision
procedure that satisfies four conditions: the "universal domain" condition, which requires that the
decision procedure be complete; the "anonymity" condition, which requires that the decision proce-
dure be indifferent to the identity of the proponenets of any outcome; the "outcome indifference"
condition, which requires that it be equally difficult for competing programs to be enacted as law; and
the "positive responsiveness" condition, which requires that each citizen have the power to determine
the outcome of tie votes prior to the counting of their own vote.
39. Non-aggregative decision procedures such as lotteries cannot fulfill May's "positive respon-
siveness" condition (because under such procedures tie votes never occur), but nevertheless be justified
by arguments that do not violate conversational constraints.
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views-egalitarianism, the principle of majority vote, and perhaps other
things as well.
Ackerman's main argument fails. Even so, his book is important. It
articulates a liberal political philosophy that offers a coherent alternative
to utilitarianism, social contract theory, and libertarianism, the three
large-scale views that seem currently to be receiving the most attention
from political philosophers. Ackerman's liberalism is not the guaranteed
consequence of a commitment to purely neutral dialogue, but it may be
able to hold its own in the actual rough and tumble dialogue of the real
world. Only time will tell.
A New Champion for the Will Theory
Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. By
Charles Fried. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981. Pp.
156. $14.00
Anthony T. Kronmant
Contract as Promise,' Charles Fried's readable and provocative book on
the philosophical foundations of contract law, has two attractive features.
The first is its attention to legal detail. After setting out a general theory
of promissory obligation, Fried discusses a number of specific topics in the
law of contracts, including the doctrine of consideration, the rules of offer
and acceptance, the consequences of mistake, the nature of duress and un-
conscionability, and the theory of conditions. The clarity with which Fried
states his main thesis and the determination with which he pursues it
through the labyrinth of contract doctrine give the impression that even
the most technical corners of contract law may not be wholly without re-
deeming philosphical significance.
Fried makes a powerful case for the view that the law of contracts has a
recognizable and distinctive intellectual integrity of its own. Whether he is
right or wrong on this score, his book is a useful antidote to the still-
prevailing realist skepticism that conceives contract law as a body of only
loosely connected rules and principles defying philosophical (or any other)
rationalization. "Contract law is complex, and it is easy to lose sight of its
essential unity."2 Beginning students will find Fried's unifying hypothesis
helpful in organizing their thoughts; seasoned realists may be unper-
suaded, but their convictions will be tested and their wits sharpened by his
argument.
The second attractive feature of Fried's book is its undogmatic charac-
ter. According to Fried, the life of contract is the promise principle, "that
principle by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981) [herein-
after cited by page number only].
2. P. 6.
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none existed before." 3 Fried's defense of the promise principle revives an
older and now largely disfavored theory of contractual obligation, the so-
called "will theory" of contract. However, unlike his nineteenth-century
predecessors, Fried acknowledges that other, non-promissory princi-
ples-those centered around the notions of reliance, benefit and shar-
ing-also play an important and legitimate role in the contractual do-
main. One of the central aims of his book is to show how these various
non-promissory elements come into contract law without displacing the
promise principle from its controlling position. In Fried's view, propo-
nents of the classical will theory made the fatal mistake of attempting to
prove too much. They assumed that the promise principle occupies an
exclusive, rather than merely dominant position in the field of contract
law, and must therefore provide the final explanation for every rule, down
to its smallest doctrinal wrinkle. This assumption led, he claims, to "a far
more rigid approach than the theory of contract as promise requires."' 4 By
contrast, Fried's own ambition is to solve the "perennial conundrums" of
contract law in ways that "accord with the idea of contract as promise and
with decency and common sense as well."5 His appreciation of the limits
of the promise principle and his unwillingness, beyond a certain point, to
sacrifice plausibility for simplicity, give Fried's book added appeal and
make his philosophical thesis easier to accept.
Fried begins by asserting that the promise principle is "the moral basis
of contract law."6 A contract is an enforceable promise or set of promises,
and whatever the legal consequences of his nonperformance, a person who
has made a contract is morally obligated to keep it just because he has
promised to do so. This obligation is self-imposed-it is one that the
promisor voluntarily assumes by committing himself to behave in a certain
way at some future time. According to Fried, neither the other party's
reliance on his promise nor the benefit which the promisor himself real-
izes from the arrangement explains why he has a moral obligation to per-
form. A promisor is bound because he has promised, because he has said
or done something that conventionally signals commitment, and although
reliance and benefit may provide additional reasons for enforcing a prom-
ise they are not necessary conditions of promissory liability. "To enforce a
promise as such is to make a defendant render a performance (or its
money equivalent) just because he has promised that very thing."7
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mitment to individualism. We must, he says, accept the promise principle
in order to protect the "quintessentially individualist" domain of private
contractual association from the incursion of princples "that are inelucta-
bly collective in origin and thus readily turned to collective ends."" Con-
tract as Promise is, in fact, an anti-collectivist book in three distinct
senses.
First, Fried opposes his own version of the will theory to the view
(which he associates with Grant Gilmore and Patrick Atiyah)9 that con-
tractual liability is based on reliance rather than promise and is therefore
"a special case of tort liability."10 Tort law deals with the conflicts arising
from involuntary transactions; as a consequence, "the role of the commu-
nity in adjudicating [such] conflict[s] is particularly prominent."" Accord-
ing to Fried, "so long as we see contractual obligation as based on prom-
ise, on obligations that the parties have themselves assumed, the focus of
the inquiry is on the will of the parties."' 2 In tort law, however, the will
of the parties cannot be controlling; here, courts must of necessity take
their cue from the "community's sense of fairness"" and other collective
standards. Consequently, according to Fried, the assimilation of contract
to tort means "the subordination of a quintessentially individualist ground
for obligation and form of social control"'" to a collectivist conception of
liability-a result he considers morally objectionable.
A second form of collectivism, which Fried also opposes, derives from
the view that "contractual relations establish ties of community between
the parties," ties that "generate their own moral imperatives." According
to this view, the parties to a contract are under a special duty to deal with
each other in good faith and to act with a concern for one another's well-
being, rather than pressing their individual advantage to the legally per-
mitted limit. In Fried's judgment, this view (which he associates with his
colleagues Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger) has tyrannical implica-
tions: if individuals are no longer free to define their own obligations to
one another, however limited or extensive these obligations may be, but
are forced, instead, to share their advantages and disappointments with
others in a spirit of communal altruism, they are no longer autonomous
persons. They become, instead, (in Rawls's phrase) "so many different
8. P. 5.
9. See also Fried, Book Review, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1858 (1980) (reviewing P. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979)) (associating Atiyah with view that contractual liability
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lines along which rights and duties are to be assigned and scarce means of
satisfaction allocated . . so as to give the greatest fulfillment of wants."1
Fried rejects the suggestion that an "ethic of altruism" be forcibly imposed
on contractual partners (although he commends sharing, both in contrac-
tual and other relationships, where it is voluntary in nature).
Finally, Contract as Promise is a brief against a third form of collectiv-
ism, one premised upon the claim that contract law is an appropriate ve-
hicle for redistributing wealth in order to achieve a larger measure of
justice in society as a whole. Fried is not opposed to forced redistribution
per se"-he believes that up to a point the state is justified in taking
wealth from some and transferring it to others-but he argues that it is
inefficient and immoral to manipulate the rules of contract law in order to
achieve distributive goals.
I shall return to Fried's attack on redistributionism later in this Re-
view. First, however, I want to examine his general theory of promissory
obligation, the theory that underlies his account of contractual liability
and that provides the basis of his opposition to each of the collectivisms I
have described. The soundness of Fried's entire argument depends upon
the adequacy of his answer to the question: Why is a person obliged to
keep the promises he makes? There are, I think, reasons to be dissatisfied
with the answer he gives.
II
Although the subject of his book is contract law, Fried begins with a
more general topic: the nature and source of promissory obligation. Why
does a promise bind his maker? What is the basis of the promisor's moral
duty, in the absence of excusing conditions, to keep his promise? Accord-
ing to Fried, a promise has an independent moral force that cannot be
explained by, or reduced to, non-promissory elements like reliance (on the
part of the promisee) or benefit (to the promisor). To show this, he sepa-
rates these various possible grounds of obligation-reliance, benefit and
promise-and examines the moral significance of each in isolation. Imag-
ine, first, a situation in which there is reliance without any accompanying
benefit to the party being relied upon or any promise by him to the one
who has acted in reliance: I move in to the apartment next to yours be-
cause I enjoy listening to you practice with the other members of your
string quartet and after some time, you decide to hold your practice ses-
sions elsewhere. Although I am disappointed by your decision, I have no
grounds for complaint and certainly none for compensation. If you did not
16. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 27 (1971).
17. P. 106.
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promise that you would continue to practice in your apartment you do me
no wrong, no moral wrong, by upsetting my expectations. This case dem-
onstrates that reliance alone gives rise to no obligation, legal or moral;
before it can, it must be supplemented either by a promise or the failure
to observe some socially recognized standard of due care.
Similarly, according to Fried, the bare fact of benefit is not sufficient,
by itself, to make the benefitted party morally or legally liable to compen-
sate the person from whom he has received the benefit. If, unrequested,
you play a Beethoven sonata under my window and then present me with
a bill, I have no obligation to pay you even though I have been greatly
pleased by the concert and you had reason to know that I would be.
Again, only if I have promised to pay (or have in some other way en-
couraged the belief that you would be paid) do I have a duty to compen-
sate you for the benefit I have received.
What do these examples demonstrate? At most, they show that neither
benefit nor reliance is a sufficient basis of liability. In the absence of an
accompanying promise (or duty to observe a prescribed standiard of care),
neither element gives rise to any obligation, even a moral obligation, to
make compensation. This much seems unobjectionable. The difficult case,
however, is one in which there has been a promise but no reliance or
benefit. Suppose I promise to deliver a ton of wheat to you next week and
you promise to pay me $100 when I do. Before you have done anything in
reliance on my promise and before I have reaped the benefits of our con-
tractual arrangement, I tell you that I have no intention of performing. In
breaking my promise, do I violate a moral duty even though you have not
relied and I have not been benefitted? Fried's answer to this question is
an emphatic yes. According to Fried, my promise, standing alone, is a
sufficient ground of liaility even though it is not accompanied by either of
these other two elements. This does not follow, however, merely from the
fact that reliance and benefit are not themselves sufficient bases of liabil-
ity. If either reliance or benefit is a necessary condition of liability, then a
bare promise cannot be a sufficient condition since it will have to be ac-
companied by one of these other two elements for liability to exist. At the
very least, an independent argument of some sort is needed to show the
sufficiency of promise as a ground of obligation.
Fried does offer such an argument and I shall examine it in a moment.
First, however, it should be noted that whatever the philosophical merits
of his argument, Fried's basic position lacks intuitive appeal. When we
consider a case of pure promise, a case in which every vestige of reliance
has been stripped away so that nothing but the promise remains, our in-
tuitions flicker and fail to provide any dear support for the view Fried
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defends. Only where there has been reliance on the promise do our intu-
itions incline us strongly in the direction of enforcement.
To see this, consider more closely the case I described a moment ago.
Suppose that after being told I no longer intend to deliver the wheat, you
make a substitute purchase in the market for $125, the price of wheat
having increased in the period following our original agreement. In addi-
tion, it costs you $5 (in telephone calls, brokerage fees, etc.) to arrange a
substitute transaction. You then sue me for damages. How much are you
entitled to recover, on the assumption that I am in breach? Clearly, $30:
this is the amount needed to put you in the position you would have been
in had I performed. But although the $30 represents compensation for
what is usually called your lost expectation (the advantage of a favorable
executory contract) in one rather obvious sense it is really your reliance
interest that is being protected-here just as much as in cases like Security
Stove v. American Ry. Express Co. that distinguish the plaintiff's reliance
from his expectancy.' You have been harmed by your reliance on my
promise to deliver the wheat for $100; if I had not made such a promise,
you would presumably have made another contract on similar terms with
someone else, before the market price of wheat had risen. You are re-
quired to go back into the market and make a substitute contract at an
advanced price only because you relied on my promise to perform. In
short, the harm suffered here is a reliance injury-as it is in every broken
contract. Consequently, if we assume that you have not been harmed in
any way by your reliance on my promise to deliver the wheat, we must
assume that you have not been damaged at all-that you can costlessly
arrange a substitute contract at an identical price. But if that is so, your
damages will be zero even if I admit the wrongfulness of my breach. Put
differently, if I make a promise to you and then renege before there has
been any reliance on your part, I may have wronged you in some abstract
sense but I have not harmed you in a way that requires compensation.
And if I owe you no duty of compensation, it makes little sense to say that
my promise, by itself, is a sufficient basis of liability. Liability for what?
Perhaps Fried would favor an award of punitive damages where there has
been no reliance, but there is little intuitive (and even less legal) support
for such a position. If anything, our intuitions support the view that a
promisor should be made to "render a performance (or its money
equivalent)" only where his promise is accompanied by some reli-
ance-even if it is hidden or non-quantifiable-on the part of the
promisee."
18. 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932) (plaintiff awarded reliance, but not expectancy
damages, in action against railroad for failure to transport experimental furnace to exhibition).
19. One might object that if this is so it is difficult to explain why we measure damages by the
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Fried's philosophical defense of the promise principle is likewise uncon-
vincing. His argument, which rests upon a position known as convention-
alism, begs the very question it is meant to answer. According to Fried,
[t]he invocation of benefit and reliance are attempts to explain the
force of a promise in terms of two of its most usual effects, but the
attempts fail because these effects depend on the prior assumption of
the force of the commitment. The way out of the puzzle is to recog-
nize the bootstrap quality of the argument: To have forde in a par-
ticular case promises must be assumed to have force generally. Once
that general assumption is made, the effects we intentionally produce
by a particular promise may be morally attributed to us. This recog-
nition is not as paradoxical as its abstract statement here may make
it seem. It lies, after all, behind every conventional structure: games,
institutions and practices, and most important, language.2"
The convention of promising makes it possible for me to commit myself to
a future course of conduct and for others to count on my behaving in the
promised way. This not only facilitates mutually beneficial exchanges over
time; in Fried's view, it also increases my own freedom. "In order that I
be as free as possible, that my will have the greatest possible range consis-
tent with the similar will of others, it is necessary that there be a way in
which I may commit myself. 2' And while it is true that promising re-
stricts the promisor, the restriction, according to Fried, is self-imposed
"just in order to increase one's options in the long run, and thus [is] per-
fectly consistent with the principle of autonomy-consistent with a respect
for one's own autonomy and the autonomy of others."2 Fried claims that
in order to commit myself in this way, to put "my future performance into
your hands," all that is required is a convention for signalling commit-
ment, a device "which we both invoke, which you know I am invoking
when I invoke it, which I know that you know I am invoking, and so
on."
23
Fried's argument amounts to this: the institution or convention of
promising is a kind of game, the purpose of which is to increase individual
promisee's expectancy rather than his out-of-pocket reliance losses where both are calculable and the
latter amount is the smaller of the two. The answer is that the promisee's reliance will often be equal
to his expectancy, and where it is not, can rarely be measured with the precision this objection as-
sumes. If it could, a rule requiring compensation only for out-of-pocket losses would be both fair and
efficient, and would have considerable intuitive appeal. Given these difficulties of calculation, however,
a rule which in effect sets the promisee's reliance loss equal to his expectancy is preferable on admin-
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freedom and facilitate exchange. A specific promise-my promise to de-
liver wheat to you next week-is a move within this game and is governed
by the game's rules. One of the rules (indeed the central rule) in the game
of promising is that a promise has independent moral force and creates an
obligation to behave in a certain way even in the absence of reliance or
benefit.
In assessing Fried's theory of promissory obligation, it is helpful to be-
gin by distinguishing between justifications or explanations which attempt
to provide support for a convention and those which are intended to justify
particular moves within the convention itself.24 It may be that within the
convention of promising, the obligation to keep a promise is deemed to
arise from the promise itself, whether or not there has been any benefit to
the promisor or reliance by the promisee. If this is in fact the case, the
sufficiency of promise as a ground of liability will be one of the basic rules
in the game of promising. It does not follow, however, that the game as a
whole-the institution of promising-can be explained or justified without
invoking one of these other elements, in particular the concept of reliance.
There may be perfectly good reasons of an administrative sort for enforc-
ing individual promises even where there has been no demonstrable reli-
ance on the part of the promisee (perhaps one believes that in most cases
of this sort there has been some reliance although it is difficult to prove).
The adoption of what might be called a no-reliance rule of promissory
liablity is, however, entirely compatible with the view that the purpose of
promising as an institution is to encourage individuals to rely on one an-
other and that it does so by protecting their reliance interest (broadly con-
strued to include their expectancy as well). Put differently, one may think
that particular promises should be enforced whether or not there has been
any reliance on the part of the promisee, but believe that promise-keeping
is in general a moral or legal duty only because it is wrong to encourage
the reliance of others and then disappoint their expectations. The former
is a rule within the convention of promising, the latter a view about its
point or purpose.
Fried's own account of the institution of promising places heavy em-
phasis on the notion of trust, which is closely related to the concept of
reliance. According to Fried, the purpose of promising is twofold: to ex-
pand the field of individual freedom and to promote "a general regime of
trust and confidence in promises" that is "deeper than and independent of
the social utility it permits. 25 Promising, in his view, is "a device that
free, moral individuals have fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and
24. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
25. P. 17.
The Yale Law Journal
which gathers its moral force from that premise." 6 After having argued so
vigorously against a reliance-based conception of promissory liability, it is
striking that Fried grounds the institution of promise-making in the re-
lated notion of trust, basing his own argument on considerations that seem
to support a two-level view of the sort just described.
Perhaps because he is aware of the potential inconsistency between his
rejection of all reliance-based theories of contractual obligation and his
own emphasis on the importance of trust, Fried makes a strenuous effort
to associate trust with the concept of personal autonomy, a concept he
elaborates in abstract moral terms and without any reference to reliance.
According to Fried, one violates another's autonomy, uses him in a way
inconsistent with his status as a moral person, by making a promise and
then inexcusably failing to keep it. This general claim is, however, per-
fectly compatible with the view that reliance is a necessary condition of
promissory liability. It is undoubtedly wrong for a promisor to disappoint
the legitimate expectations of his promisee by failing to keep his promise
just because he finds it more convenient to do so. But what are the prom-
isee's legitimate expectations? May the promisee rightfully expect the
promissor to keep his promise even where the promisee has not relied and
the promisor will be inconvenienced by performance? Perhaps I am only
entitled to trust others not to encourage my reliance on promises they sub-
sequently refuse to keep. This is a perfectly defensible position and Fried
offers no reasons for construing trust, and the duty of promise-keeping
based upon it, in any other way.
His invocation of the Kantian injunction against using other persons as
means for promoting our own welfare adds little to Fried's argument. Is it
clear that I use another person, in a way inconsistent with his moral sta-
tus, by failing to keep a promise on which he has not relied? Or is he
using me in an impermissible fashion if he insists that I have a duty to
keep my promise, instead of recognizing that under the circumstances he
owes me a "duty of release" ?27 Granted that it is in general wrong to use
another person, it can plausibly be argued that my obligation not to use
you is founded upon your reliance; indeed, it would be perfectly possible
to construct a reliance-based theory of promissory obligation on the gen-
eral Kantian principle of respect for persons that Fried invokes.
The concept of individual freedom, which Fried also emphasizes in his
account of the moral foundations of promising, is similarly inconclusive.
Even if we assume that "the restrictions involved in promising are restric-
tions undertaken just in order to increase one's options in the long run" (a
26. Id.
27. I owe this point to Jerry Mashaw.
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claim that raises what Fried himself calls "deep and difficult" problems
concerning the temporal continuity of the self and the identify of per-
sons),2" there does not appear to be any reason for thinking that a strict,
no-reliance rule of promissory liability is more likely to promote individ-
ual freedom than a rule that recognizes a duty to keep one's promises only
where there has been some reliance on the part of the promisee. In the
absence of any reliance, the freedom of the promisor can be increased by
permitting him to rescind his earlier promise-at no cost to the promisee.
Does this nevertheless diminish the promisee's freedom or compromise his
autonomy? Not obviously: like trust and respect, freedom is an indetermi-
nate concept and can be interpreted in various ways, not all of which are
inconsistent with the view Fried wishes to reject, the view that reliance is
a necessary condition of promissory liability.
In sum, Fried's conventionalist argument fails to show that the institu-
tion of promising rests upon a belief in the sufficiency of promise as a
ground of moral obligation. Whether it makes sense, within the conven-
tion of promising, to enforce all promises regardless of the promisee's reli-
ance is, I reiterate, an entirely different question. However, an affirmative
answer to this question is almost certain to turn upon considerations of
administrative convenience rather than moral principle and thus cannot
provide the ethical foundation for the promise principle that Fried seeks.
The promise principle is not supported by our intuitions, and Fried's
philosophical defense of it has, as he himself acknowledges, a "bootstrap"
and therefore question-begging quality.
III
Not all promises are contracts. Some promises-indeed, a significant
number of those we make in the ordinary course of living-are not legally
enforceable; although we may have a moral obligation to keep such
promises, no legal sanction attaches to their breach. Why are only some
promises contracts and what determines which promises are singled out
for legal enforcement? Any comprehensive theory of contract law must
have an answer to this question. In the Anglo-American law of contracts,
the same question has traditionally been put in different and seemingly
more specific terms: which promises are supported by consideration, and
which are purely gratuitous and hence legally unenforceable? The doc-
trine of consideration is the main intellectual tool with which lawyers in
the common-law tradition have attempted to delimit the bounds of the
legally enforceable within the wider domain of promissory obligation.
28. P. 14. Fried promises to address this problem later in the book but, so far as I can determine,
never returns to it.
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Fried devotes a chapter to the doctrine of consideration and it is here that
a reader must look for his explanation of the obvious but puzzling fact
that not all morally binding promises are contracts underwritten by the
authoritarian powers of the state.
Fried's discussion of the consideration doctrine is sharply critical. The
criticisms he offers, however, are of two different sorts-one normative,
the other positive-and it is never entirely clear which of them he means
to emphasize or what he conceives the relationship between them to be.
For the most part, Fried uses his own concept of promissory obligation to
criticize the consideration doctrine on moral grounds and to dramatize its
alleged irrationalities. He also implies, however, that the promise princi-
ple best explains the evolving content of contract law and is to be pre-
ferred to the consideration doctrine on this basis as well. The latter, posi-
tivistic use of the promise principle is more pronounced elsewhere in the
book (for example, in his chapter on offer and acceptance); even in his
discussion of the consideration doctrine, however, Fried combines his at-
tack on the doctrine's moral foundations with an implied criticism of its
descriptive adequacy. This combination of normative and positive ele-
ments explains, perhaps, the curiously qualified conclusion that he
reaches:
I conclude that the life of contract is indeed promise, but this conclu-
sion is not exactly a statement of positive law. There are too many
gaps in the common law enforcement of promises to permit so bold a
statement. My conclusion is rather that the doctrine of consideration
offers no coherent alternative basis [as a descriptive principle? a nor-
mative ideal?] for the force of contracts, while still treating promises
as necessary to it.2
9
Fried's normative criticisms of the consideration doctrine are based
upon his belief that it imposes "substantial if random restrictions on per-
fectly rational projects."3 What ought to matter, according to Fried, is the
freedom with which a promise is made, not whether it is part of a bargain
or exchange of economic values. By limiting the class of enforceable ar-
rangements to bargains, the doctrine of consideration "holds that individ-
ual self-determination is not a sufficient ground of legal obligation, and so
implies that collective policies may after all override individual judgments,
frustrating the projects of promisees after the fact and the potential
projects of promisors."" As an alternative, Fried endorses what he calls
"the liberal principle that the free arrangements of rational persons
29. Pp. 37-38 (emphasis added).
30. P. 35.
31. Id.
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should be respected."32 This excludes, of course, unfree or coerced ar-
rangements and those of irrational persons such as children or the men-
tally incompetent. There is, however, according to Fried, no good reason
for imposing the additional requirement that a promise be supported by
consideration before it can be enforced at law.
Despite his antipathy to the doctrine of consideration, Fried stops short
of suggesting that all promises be legally enforceable-wisely, since such a
proposal would undoubtedly strike most of his readers as either pointless
or impractical, and in any case unwarranted by even the most stringent
conception of promissory obligation. According to Fried, for a promise to
be enforceable it "must be freely made and not unfair" and in addition
"[tihe promisor must have been serious enough that subsequent legal en-
forcement was an aspect of what he should have contemplated at the time
he promised."" A footnote makes it clear that this last qualification is
meant to deal with the problem of the so-called "social promise"-the
invitation to dinner, the promise to take a walk, the agreement to visit an
ailing friend in the hospital-which no one intends to be legally enforcea-
ble.34 These promises may give rise to a moral obligation on the part of
the promisor but absent very special circumstances they do not create a
corresponding legal duty. Traditonally, this has been explained by appeal
to the doctrine of consideration: social promises are gratuitous and there-
fore legally unenforceable. Fried's theory of promissory obligation bars
him from explaining the unenforceability of social promises in this way;
instead, he attempts to do so by appealing to the intentions of the parties.
If A and B intend to create a legally binding relationship, their intention
should be given effect (so long as their agreement is free and fair); simi-
larly, if they intend their relationship, whatever its moral implications, to
have no legal consequences, this, too, should be recognized and respected.
Thus, the decision as to which promises are contracts is left to the parties
themselves, a result that is entirely consistent with Fried's general belief
that individual self-determination is the ground of all promissory
obligation.
There is, however, a problem with Fried's (very brief) explanation of
the unenforceability of social promises, a problem that points to a more
serious defect in his theory of contractual obligation. Fried himself ac-
knowledges that in particular cases it may be difficult to determine
whether the parties to an agreement actually intended that it have legal
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pretation. ' 31 What is striking about this interpretive difficulty, however, is
that it cannot be solved by appeal to the actual intentions of the parties.
Instead, to solve the difficulty, it is necessary to construct a hypothetical
agreement. This is a familiar technique; it is the one which must necessa-
rily be employed whenever a court is called upon to fill a gap in an ex-
isting contract. But it is also a technique that must be used to determine
which promises are contracts, so long as one accepts Fried's suggestion
that this question is to be decided by reference to the intentions of the
parties. And even if the actual intent of the parties is always to be given
legal effect, -it will still be necessary to devise baseline rules of enforceabil-
ity or nonenforceability to deal with different kinds or classes of promises.
These rules themselves require the construction of hypothetical agree-
ments of the sort I have described.
I emphasize this point for the following reason. Early in his book,
Fried asserts that considerations of self-interest or utility cannot "supply
the moral basis of my obligation to keep a promise";"6 in Fried's view, my
obligation to do so rests solely on the fact that I have made a promise in
some conventionally recognized form. Considerations of self-interest and
utility are sure to play an important role in the construction of hypotheti-
cal agreements, however, since agreements of this sort are meant to ex-
press what it is, or would have been, rational for the parties to want. This
is something that cannot be determined on the basis of the promise princi-
ple alone. Consequently, to the extent that the legal enforceability of a
promise depends upon the intention of the parties and this in turn re-
quires-at a minimum-the construction of presumptive baseline rules
that reflect what the parties might rationally expect and intend under va-
rious circumstances, considerations of utility and self-interest will be im-
portant in deciding which promises are legally enforceable contracts. Fried
acknowledges that considerations of this sort and other, non-promissory
elements play a role within the domain of contract law; what he is less
willing to acknowledge-perhaps because it would challenge his general
theory of contractual obligation-is the extent to which they also help to
define the boundaries or limits of this domain itself.
IV
Fried's defense of the promise principle is motivated not only by an
intellectual desire to clarify the special character of contractual liability,
but also by his powerful commitment to individualism and his belief that
the sphere of private contractual association should be one in which indi-
35. Id.
36. P. 15.
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viduals are permitted to pursue their own plans and projects unburdened
by an overriding, positive duty to promote general social goals. Unlike
certain libertarians, Fried does not deny that there are collective duties of
sharing and support to which each of us is subject, independently of our
voluntary engagements with others; what he does deny is that a person's
contractual opportunities and obligations-the kinds of contracts he may
make and the terms on which he may make them-should be determined
by these same duties and the collectivist ideals they reflect.
Fried's anti-collectivism leads him to reject a number of currently fash-
ionable positions in contract scholarship-the assimilation of contract to
tort, the elevation of altruistic sharing to an enforceable duty, and the
recommendation that contract law be used as an instrument of distributive
justice, as a device for achieving a fairer distribution of resources in soci-
ety as a whole. Each view, and Fried's criticism of it, raises special
problems. I shall discuss only the last-the appropriateness of using con-
tract law as an instrument of distributive justice-since this is a position I
myself have defended and for which Fried takes me to task.37
Many rules of contract law are concerned with what is sometimes
called "policing the bargain." These rules, traditionally grouped together
in the doctrinal trilogy of fraud, duress and unconscionability, seek to dis-
tinguish between permissible and impermissible forms of advantage-taking
in the exchange process-between those types of exploitation that are
thought to undermine the basic voluntariness of an agreement and those
that are considered legitimate expressions of the self-interestedness which
motivates people to make contracts in the first place. In a recent article in
the Yale Law Journal,3 I claimed that seemingly neutral rules which
purport merely to define the limits of permissible advantage-taking in the
exchange process actually have a distributional effect insofar as they de-
termine the conditions under which various valuable advantages may or
may not be exploited by their possessors, and I argued that these same
rules ought to be evaluated by the fairness of the distributional pattern
they create. I concluded that rules of this sort should be designed, by
courts and legislatures, with a view to their distributional conse-
quences-that they should be framed, modified or abandoned in a deliber-
ate effort to promote distributive justice. While Fried acknowledges that
rules respecting the use of force and fraud in the exchange process are
likely to have distributive effects, he denied that "redistributive aims lie
behind" the judgments these rules represent.39 "Indeed it is a nonse-
quitur," Fried asserts, "to argue that because the use of force and fraud
37. See pp. 5, 83.
38. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
39. P. 76.
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may confer advantages in bargaining, therefore the general purpose be-
hind condemning them is to achieve some desired balance of advantage
between contracting parties (or indeed between all citizens)."4
Fried begin his attack on my redistributivist position by considering the
well-known case of Obde v. Schlemeyer4 In Obde, the owner of a house
sold it, failing to disclose that the house was infested with termites al-
though he knew it was. Even though the owner had done nothing to con-
ceal the infestation, the contract of sale was declared unenforceable on the
ground that the buyer had been defrauded by the owner's failure to dis-
close. Fried notes that if, contrary to the actual facts of the case, the seller
had lied to the buyer (by telling him, for example, that the house was free
of termites when he knew it was not), the seller would have had no right
to enforce the contract. He explains this on the grounds that lying is
wrong, that it is a morally impermissible "way of procuring an advan-
tage" over another.42 According to Fried, "the capacity to form true and
rational judgments and to act on them is the heart of moral personality
and the basis of a person's claim to respect as a moral being. A liar seeks
to accomplish his purpose by creating a false belief in his interlocutor, and
so he may be said to do harm by touching the mind, as an assailant does
harm by laying hands on his victim's body."' 4' Fried's moralistic explana-
tion is appealing, but can it be extended beyond what he himself calls the
"easy case" of deliberate lying? More specifically, does it tell us how
Obde itself should have been decided?
Fried raises this question himself, but instead of answering it directly,
he puts another case to the reader. Suppose, he says, that
[a]n oil company has made extensive geological surveys seeking to
identify possible oil and gas reserves. These surveys are extremely
expensive. Having identified one promising site, the oil company
(acting through a broker) buys a large tract of land from its prosper-
ous farmer owner, revealing nothing about its survey, its purposes,
or even its identity. The price paid is the going price for farmland of
that quality in that region.44
Should the farmer, upon discovering the real value of the land, be held to
his promise, or should he be excused (as the buyer was in Obde) on the
grounds that the other party owed him a duty of disclosure? According to
Fried, each case involves a unilateral mistake, and where one party to a
40. Id.
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contract has given his agreement only because he has made a mistake of
some sort, the mistaken party-the buyer in Obde or the farmer-seller in
Fried's hypothetical-cannot be said to have assumed a promissory obli-
gation: the duty to keep a promise "does not take hold where the promisor
has not knowingly undertaken that obligation." ' It does not follow, how-
ever, that a unilateral mistake necessarily renders a contract unenforce-
able; in Fried's view, the occurence of such a mistake represents what he
calls "a contractual accident,"4 the risk of which, like any other accident,
must be allocated on the basis of non-promissory considerations. "In every
mistake case," Fried claims, "no promise but the competing equities must
be used to resolve the inevitable dilemma caused by a contractual acci-
dent.""7 He then characterizes Obde as a case in which the party seeking
enforcement of the contract (the seller) not only knew of the other party's
mistake but "helped to create it," and asserts that "[w]here one of the
parties causes the accident . . . the equities quite clearly do not favor
him" (apparently concluding that Obde was correctly decided)." This last
step in the argument is unconvincing, however. Is the seller in Obde any
more the cause of his buyer's mistake than the oil company is the cause of
the farmer's error? In both cases the mistake could have been corrected by
a disclosure of the relevant information, and in neither case was the mis-
take the product of an outright lie: it makes as much sense, in my view, to
say that the mistake was equally caused or uncaused in each case, but not
caused in one and merely exploited in the other.
At this point, Fried's argument becomes somewhat difficult to follow.
As we have just seen, he denies that the buyer in his hypothetical case was
causally responsible for the seller's mistake concerning the value of his
own property. Consequently, the buyer (unlike the seller in Obde) cannot
be said to have forfeited his equitable claim "to enforce an imperfect
deal. 49 Nevertheless, there is a lack of genuine (i.e., knowing) agreement
on the seller's part and according to Fried, an "imperfect agreement
should not be enforced unless there is some equitable ground for enforcing
it." 0 This implies that the contract in his hypothetical example should not
be enforced either, although for different reasons than those justifying
nonenforcement in Obde. But Fried recognizes that "we are little inclined
. . . to deny the oil company the fruits of its bargain," and points out that
"the law would generally hold for the oil company" in a case such as he
45. P. 81.
46. Id. See also pp. 69-73 (allocation of risks between parties when circumstances arise that were
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has described."' "What lurking equity," he asks, "favors making a bargain
for the oil company, though . . . no true agreement exists?"
52
In answering his own question, Fried once again appeals to the notion
of a convention: "where the better-informed party cannot compensate for
the other's defects without depriving himself of an advantage on which he
is conventionally entitled to count, his failure to disclose will not cause the
equities to tilt against him. '53 Who the equities favor in any particular
case must therefore be determined by the set of "general background un-
derstandings" 4 that specify which forms of advantage-taking are permissi-
ble and which are not. Fried does not tell us whether a conventionalist
approach of this sort ultimately supports the famer or the oil com-
pany-both may be able to appeal to (conflicting) background under-
standings to support their positions-but he seems sure that this ap-
proach, in general terms at least, is the right one.
In Fried's view, then, the line between acceptable and unacceptable
forms of advantage-taking has to be drawn by referring to the background
conventions that explicitly or implicitly shape the parties' expectations.
This approach must be adopted, he claims, if the "past reasonable expec-
tations"55 of the parties are to be protected; by contrast, the deliberate use
of contract law to promote distributive ends is certain, in Fried's view, to
frustrate these same expectations-a result he considers both unfair and
inefficient.
This conventionalist argument is the heart of Fried's attack on the view
that contract law may properly be used as an instrument of distributive
justice; unfortunately, it does not prove what he wishes it to. The conven-
tions that define the "past reasonable expectations" of the parties to a
particular contract are, to a significant degree, the result of judicial deci-
sions and legislative enactments. Fried himself recognizes that the relevant
background conventions include those "established prospectively or gradu-
ally by courts,"56 so that the legitimate expectations of contracting parties
must be defined, at least in part, by reference to judicially formulated
rules specifying the permissible forms of advantage-taking in contractual
relationships (the extent of a party's duty to disclose, the meaning of du-
ress, the special rules governing fiduciary relationships, and so on). He
also acknowledges that in formulating such rules, a court may, among
other things, take distributive considerations into account and adopt one
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be a legitimate and desired distributive goal. 7 But if that is so, then the
pursuit of this goal will be part of the "past reasonable expectations" of
the parties to every contract governed by the rule in the sense that they
can expect their particular transaction to be carried out within a frame-
work of norms which, among other things, is designed to promote certain
distributional ends.
Fried does not object to legal rules being selected on the basis of their
distributive consequences; indeed, all that his conventionalism requires is
that particular cases not be decided for ad hoc distributional rea-
sons-giving the nod to the plaintiff in one case because he is poor and
holding for the defendant in the next for the same reason-since this
would violate the parties' right to have their dispute resolved in accor-
dance with established conventions.5 8 In Fried's view, distributive ends
may only be pursued through the establishment of general conventions; by
doing so, "the collectivity acknowledges that individuals have rights and
cannot just be sacrificed to collective goals." 9 The requirement that courts
decide cases on that basis of general conventions, rather than an ad hoc
assessment of distributional consquences, "permits individuals to plan, to
consider and pursue their own ends. And once they have made and em-
barked on plans against this background it would be unjust to change the
rules in midcourse by requiring unexpected disclosures and sharing just in
case the plans succeed."6 This all seems unobjectionable-but who is
Fried arguing against? One can certainly believe that contract law is an
appropriate vehicle for promoting distributive justice without embracing
the kind of particularism that he castigates: although Fried seems to think
that my own argument was intended to support an approach of this sort,
it is in fact incompatible with it since the incentive effects of a
rule-without which its intended distributive purpose cannot be
achieved-will be undermined if the rule is applied in an ad hoc and
unpredictable manner.
So in the final analysis, Fried has no argument against the type of
redistributionism that I defended-the only type that seems to me to be
defensible. Fried might have argued that distributive considerations should
not be taken into account even in framing the general legal rules which
form part of the background conventions surrounding every contractual
arrangement, and if he had said this, he and I would have a genuine
disagreement. Fried chooses, however, to focus his attack on redistribu-
tionism on the faithlessness to background conventions that he wrongly
57, Id.
58. Pp. 83-84, 106.
59. P. 84.
60. Id.
The Yale Law Journal
believes this position entails-wrongly, because even the most ardent de-
fender of redistributionist policies may be committed to the principle that
contract cases should be decided on the basis of general rules rather than
in an ad hoc, particularistic fashion, and accept the idea that changes in
the rules should be prospective only.
Fried is therefore wrong when he claims that those who believe the law
of contracts ought to be used as an instrument for promoting "policies of
social betterment" will consider an inquiry into "the background under-
standings (including those established by prior decisions) of a particular
case" to be a "vain, even foolish exercise.'"'1 This assumes, in effect, that
those who advocate using the law of contracts as an instrument of distrib-
utive justice are unable to distinguish between reasons that may properly
be given in justification of a particular action within an established con-
ventional framework and reasons that may be given for adopting or sup-
porting the framework in the first place. But there is nothing about redis-
tributivism itself which prevents its proponents from taking cognizance of
this distinction. I should add that this particular line of attack on redis-
tributionism is especially unconvincing in light of Fried's own tendency to
blur the distinction between these two sorts of reasons in his account of
the conventionalist foundations of promise-keeping-if anyone is guilty of
ignoring the distinction, it is Fried himself.
Like much of his book Fried's attack on redistributionism combines,
somewhat confusingly, normative and positive criticisms. Redistribution-
ism is bad, he argues, because it subordinates the rights of individuals to
the interests of the collectivity. But it is also bad, he implies, because it
falsely (or at least inaccurately) describes the Anglo-American law of con-
tracts; in Fried's view, our law of contracts-with its various rules for
policing the bargain-is better described as the elaboration of a few sim-
ple moral ideas, rooted in the concept of personal autonomy, than as a
disguised effort to promote certain distributional goals. But this descriptive
claim is also dubious. The prohibition on active deception in exchange
relationships-on hardcore fraud-does seem best explained in moral
terms of the sort Fried favors. In more difficult cases, however (those deal-
ing, for example, with the whole problem of non-disclosure) an economic-
distributionist explanation better accounts for the legal rules we actually
have (or so I have argued elsewhere). This being the case, I am inclined
to prefer an explanation of the latter sort even where hardcore fraud is
concerned ("we prohibit fraud because the long term welfare of fraud vic-
tims-indeed, of everyone in society-would be decreased by permitting
61. P. 85.
62. See Kronman, supra note 38; Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978).
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it") on the grounds that a unified theory of advantage-taking in exchange
relations is to be preferred to several different theories of limited scope.
But this may be only an aesthetic preference, and I certainly appreciate
the force of Fried's moralistic explanation of why we consider lying to be
an impermissible form of advantage-taking. Here, as elsewhere, his views
have forced me to reappraise, and in some cases significantly recast, my
own. Contract as Promise is a book full of intelligent arguments, always
challenging, if sometimes unconvincing. It is a book guaranteed to wake
even the most dogmatic collectivist from his slumbers.

